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Abstract 
During the financial crisis, many assets became illiquid and ceased trading on the open 
market, thus classifying them as level three assets.  This study attempts to determine 
whether fair value asset disclosures, especially level three assets, were viewed by the 
market as valued correctly, given the amount of subjectivity involved. This paper will 
discuss prior literature on the topics of fair value accounting, various earnings quality 
measures, and corporate governance impact on fair value disclosures.  Using models 
similar to prior papers, many of the coefficients of interest proved insignificant.  
However, the models improved when examining only the least credible firms. 
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Historical cost accounting versus fair value accounting has been argued for many 
years, especially with the possibility of United States Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) converging with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
When the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Financial Accounting 
Standard (FAS) 157, the argument only intensified as the FASB declared its position for 
the United States in favor of fair value accounting.  FAS 157 mandated certain assets to 
be disclosed at fair value and broken up in different levels.  During the financial crisis of 
the mid-2000’s, many financial securities lost much or all of their value, and banks took a 
huge hit.  Certain assets, more specifically level three assets, use subjectivity in 
determining their fair value.  Firms had a huge incentive to overstate these assets to 
improve the bottom line.  However, this would decrease the usefulness of the financial 
statements.  Firms who historically manipulate earnings with higher deviations in 
accruals can be considered poor financial reporting credibility firms.  The market could 
either view firms’ poor financial reporting credibility as a hindrance and discount fair 
value assets, know about poor financial reporting credibility but not factor it in by 
believing that all firms overstate assets, or not understand which firms have poor earnings 
quality. 
Background 
 A widespread accounting debate began in September 2006 when the FASB issued 
FAS 157, Fair Value Measurements.  FAS 157 clarifies the definition of fair value 
accounting while assigning three separate buckets for financial assets.  Furthermore, FAS 
157 altered disclosure requirements and explained that changes in credit risks must be 
included in valuation models. First, fair value is defined as the price that a firm would 
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receive for an asset or pay for a liability in the open market on a certain measurement 
date.  This differs from the previous understanding because values were based on exit 
prices, the price at which the asset could be sold, rather than the entry price, the price that 
the asset can be bought, no matter if the firm intended to hold the asset or sell it on a later 
date.  This definition causes firms to continually update the valuations of their financial 
assets and liabilities, which raises the argument that FAS 157 only increases auditor fees 
instead of achieving its primary purpose of helping investors with more financial 
reporting transparency.  Because auditors will need to take more time to evaluate these 
valuations, the accounting firms will charge a higher fee to their clients.  The exit price 
would also capture the optimistic buyer as well as the risk-adverse buyer because it is a 
market-based price and would be an average of both types. Additionally, FAS 157 
buckets financial assets into three separate categories, which an investor can see 
disclosed in the financial statements.  Level one assets are the easiest to value, because 
they have market observable prices already on exchanges.  An example of a level one 
asset includes stock prices traded on public exchanges such as the New York Stock 
Exchange.  Level two assets do not have market observable prices, but do have market 
observable inputs, which lead to fairly simple pricing.  An interest rate swap is an 
example of a level two asset, as the value can be determined by market-based interest 
rates and risk premiums.  The most difficult assets to value are level three assets where 
no market prices or inputs exist.  To value level three assets, firms must use internal 
valuation models or best guesses to the discounted cash flows from the asset.  I will 
discuss level three assets more fully in a moment. The last item FAS 157 requires is 
 8 
 
inclusion of credit risk in valuation models.  Because of the market price component, 
which includes risk, a higher discount rate will be applied to more risky assets. 
 If firms must mark-to-market, what happens if a market does not exist? 
Sometimes, especially in times of financial crisis, securities are traded so infrequently 
because buyers are shying away from certain securities. In cases where a thin market 
exists, firms must use valuation models or their best guesses to the projected discounted 
cash flows from that security.  During the financial crisis of the late 2000’s, markets fell 
completely apart and securities ceased trading. As the liquidity of banks fell rapidly, 
extremely large financial institutions collapsed and the federal government needed to step 
in and bail them out. This created a shock of consumer and investor confidence as the 
stock markets crashed, the housing market plunged further away from its high in the early 
2000’s, and economic activity stifled. In 2008, when this happened concurrently, the 
values of bank securities plummeted, and, under FAS 157, financial institutions needed to 
mark-to-market.  These banks took huge hits to their bottom line with the losses from 
their securities piling up. Much of the blame for the causes of the financial crisis can be 
attributed to banks writing complex financial instruments, a housing market that became 
too large, and the excessive writing of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities; although, 
some have argued that FAS 157 and fair value accounting may have helped multiply the 
effects of the financial crisis, which will be discussed later.  However, if FAS 157 will 
continue to be in existence, this argument only stresses the importance of correct 
valuation models used by firms in the absence of market prices. 
In each type of model, firms use their own assumptions. This makes it especially 
harder, but more lucrative, for audit firms, which may be part of the reason accounting 
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firms continued to expand during this time of crisis. Audit firms, such as Deloitte and 
Touche, needed to change their auditing techniques to accommodate FAS 157 and the 
influx of level three assets. Deloitte issued a flow chart of three separate actions to take in 
order to test the client’s internal valuation model.1  The first action tests the client’s 
model by obtaining the client’s documentation, assessing the model for reasonableness 
and appropriateness. Once Deloitte is satisfied with the basic model, they become more 
detailed and test each significant assumption, the valuation model, and any underlying 
data involved.  After, specialists in valuation/pricing evaluate the appropriateness of the 
model used and market inputs.  The second action has Deloitte doing the same process as 
the client, but without any of the client’s documentation or assumptions.  Deloitte must 
develop an independent expectation itself by using the Pricing Center or appropriate 
Internal Fair Value specialist to develop this independent price.  They then compare their 
price with the client’s price while applying any thresholds involved.  Lastly, Deloitte 
compares subsequent or recent transaction prices to the client’s price while applying any 
thresholds involved. This is obviously a very arduous process, but with so many 
assumptions and discretions used by firms, extremely necessary. Improper and incorrect 
valuation models totally negate the sole purpose of FAS 157: the usefulness of financial 
information to investors.  
To help improve the usefulness of financial information to investors, the FASB 
issued three final Staff Positions (FSP’s) to provide additional information on the 
application and disclosure guidelines for fair value measurements and impairments of 
                                                        
1 Appendix A: Guidance on Auditing the Fair Value of Financial Instruments. Deloitte and Touche. 
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securities.2 More specifically, FSP FAS 157-4, Determining Fair Value When the Volume 
and Level of Activity for the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and 
Identifying Transactions That Are Not Orderly, attempts to provide more guidelines 
consistent with FAS 157. When the volume and level of activity for the asset or liability 
have significantly decreased, the markets become inactive. Transactions that are not 
orderly refer to those where the price inputs being used represent distressed prices. FSP 
FAS 157-4 reiterates that the fair value component of FAS 157 refers to the price the 
asset would be sold at in an orderly transaction, so judgment must be used to ascertain 
whether transactions within the market are not orderly anymore and to determine the fair 
values when markets become inactive. Venture capitalist Jason Mendelson writes that 
due to the amount of discretion and the ability to purposely game or make an honest 
mistake with the valuations of securities, FAS 157 is “stupid”.3 With the amount of 
discretion involved, a question is raised regarding investor perception of firms’ valuation 
techniques.  
Literature Review 
No literature exists that has examined fair value accounting in this respect during 
the financial crisis.  Stock price and earnings management by banks has been examined, 
but investor perception of fair value assets has never been looked at.  Most of the 
research in this area piece together aspects of my question.  Laux and Leuz (2009) 
examine the theoretical problems of FAS 157 and fair value accounting’s contributions to 
                                                        
2 "NEWS RELEASE 04/09/09." FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board. Web. 12 Sept. 2011. 
<http://www.fasb.org/news/nr040909.shtml>. 
3 Mendelson, Jason. "FAS 157 Is Stupid." Tech News | Innovation News | Money News | VentureBeat. 
Web. 13 Sept. 2011. <http://venturebeat.com/2009/01/15/why-fas-157-is-stupid/>. 
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the financial crisis.4  In theory, large losses through drops in prices of financial assets can 
lead to big problems for banks.  These losses and write-downs deplete bank capital and 
lead banks to sell assets at depressed prices to avoid the huge losses, setting off a spiral of 
even lower prices.  Once a bank in trouble sells financial assets at depressed prices, the 
market reflects that price and affects otherwise sound banks in their mark-to-market 
accounting.  Reasonably sound banks may begin to have capital problems due to this 
contagion of prices.  Fortunately for advocates of fair value accounting and FAS 157, 
these two authors found little to no evidence suggesting that fair value accounting 
worsened bank problems during the financial crisis.  In fact, they found that the opposite 
happened.  Banks were able to use the discretionary valuation methods under FAS 157 to 
keep asset values high compared to current market prices and future expectations.  This 
could lead to overstating of assets, and the market may discount banks’ fair value assets 
to reflect the overstatements.  On the other hand, maybe past financial reporting could be 
indicative as to how the market perceives the valuation models that banks employ.  As 
these authors indicate, more research must be done to determine these theories. 
 Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) examine earnings management in the banking 
industry.5  In their study, they first observe that public banks are more likely than private 
banks to engage in earnings management.  They conclude that public banks use 
accounting discretion to transform small declines in Return on Assets (ROA) into small 
increases.  This makes sense because public banks must appeal to stockholders and meet 
                                                        
4
 Laux, Christian, and Christian Leuz. "Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?" 
Center for Financial Studies (2009). Web. 18 Sept. 2011. 
5 Beatty, Anne L., Bin Ke, and Kathy R. Petroni. "Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines 
across Publicly and Privately Held Banks." The Accounting Review 77.3 (2002): 547-70. Web. 18 Sept. 
2011 
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analyst projections while private banks do not.  They also examine direct evidence of 
earnings management by examining two different components of banks’ earnings that 
researchers have shown are subject to manipulation: loan loss provisions and realized 
security gains and losses.  Because the loan loss provision is based on management’s 
assumptions and discretion, bank managers can avoid small declines in earnings by 
underestimating the loan loss provision.  Bank managers can also avoid these small 
declines by realizing more security gains or fewer losses.  In their first regression, they 
use a model that I will also use to estimate the nondiscretionary portion of the loan loss 
provision.  In their second regression, they use another model to estimate the 
nondiscretionary portion of the realized security gains and losses. 
When examining earnings management, Hribar and Nichols (2007) argue that the 
volatility of accruals is naturally dependent upon the volatility of the firm’s underlying 
operating cash flows.6  This cash flow volatility reflects the underlying volatility of a 
firm’s operations.  They also find that the volatility of sales is highly correlated with the 
volatility of accruals.  They were the first researchers to come up with this idea, but it 
seems obvious now. Even the modest correlation between both volatility of operating 
cash flows and volatility of sales severely inflates rejection rates for tests at the 5% and 
1% levels.  When researchers control for these volatility variables, the test specification 
improves dramatically.  The authors call this idea the “control variable approach.”  
Including operating volatility and sales volatility in the regressions serve as a control for 
correlated omitted variables when testing for earnings management.  This significantly 
improves any earnings management measures used in research. 
                                                        
6 Hribar, P. and D. Craig Nichols (2007), The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of 
Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting Research, 45: 1017–1053. 
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Song, Thomas, and Yi (1995) used a modified Ohlson model, which has been 
used extensively in literature, to estimate the association between share prices and fair 
values of assets and liabilities per share.7  These authors wanted to see if the value 
relevance of level one and level two fair values is greater than the value relevance of 
level three fair values.  However, they found through their regression model that all fair 
value level information is value relevant.  Level one and level two assets (liabilities) have 
valuation coefficients close to their theoretically predicted values of one (negative one).  
Level three assets have valuation coefficients of slightly less than one and less than the 
valuation coefficients of level one and level two assets.  Interestingly enough, level three 
liabilities have a valuation coefficient less than negative one (i.e., absolute value greater 
than one), and also less than level one and level two liabilities.  These results suggest that 
investors do not place as much weight on the less reliable level three assets in equity 
pricing as they do level one and level two.  This could be due to the riskiness of the 
assets, errors in input estimation, and manipulation of the valuation models.  They also 
determine that the strength of a firm’s corporate governance influences the value 
relevance of fair value assets.  The stronger a firm’s corporate governance, the higher the 
fair value relevance for each tier of assets, especially level three assets.  The coefficient 
attached to level three assets is close to zero and not significant with firms with low 
corporate governance, but much closer to one and significant with firms with high 
corporate governance.  Due to the amount of discretion used in valuing level three assets, 
it makes sense that a firm with better corporate governance would be perceived to have 
                                                        
7
 Song, Chang Joon, Wayne B. Thomas, and Han Yi. "Value Relevance of FAS No. 157 Fair Value 
Hierarchy Information and the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms." The Accounting Review 
85.4 (2010): 1375. Web. 18 Sept. 2011. 
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better valuation numbers.  For my study, instead of using corporate governance as an 
interaction variable, I use past financial reporting credibility. 
Theory 
Financial reporting credibility means investor confidence in the financial 
statements or other disclosures of companies.  Misstatements and qualified opinions by 
the external auditors all could potentially impact financial reporting credibility 
negatively.  When firms build this financial reporting credibility up through time, 
investors are more likely to believe the earnings in the financial statements.  Prior 
research has proved that using a three-month lag time from a firm’s year-end date to the 
investigation into the stock price accurately reflects a firm’s earnings up until that year-
end data.8 After this three-month period in which the financial statements are released 
and the market can adjust its view of the firm, stock prices are said to be reflective of the 
firm’s current state and potential growth.  The fluctuations in the stock price from the 
beginning of the three-month period to the end are reactions to the disclosures in the 
financial statements.  If investors perceive a particular firm as having high financial 
reporting credibility, the stock price should accurately reflect the firm’s earnings and 
potential growth.  However, if a firm has lower financial reporting credibility, the market 
would discount the stock price due to the uncertainty surrounding the disclosures 
contained within the financial statements. 
 Financial reporting credibility begins with managers at the firm level.  These 
managers face a dilemma each and every day.  Because stock price serves as a basic level 
                                                        
8 Easton, Peter D., and Mark E. Zmijewski. "SEC Form 10K/10Q Reports and Annual Reports to 
Shareholders: Reporting Lags and Squared Market Model Prediction Errors." Journal of Accounting 
Research 31.1 (1993): 113. Web. 27 Nov. 2011. 
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of executive performance, managers have a huge incentive to see that stock price 
increase.  If the stock price stagnates or decreases, executives will be fired.  If the stock 
price continually increases, managers will keep their jobs and earn more compensation 
through their stock options.  Managers must decide between accounting policies and 
estimates that accurately reflect the underlying economics of the business and inflating 
earnings through accounting manipulations such as a lower loan loss provision or bad 
debt expense.  Knowing that small misses in meeting earnings goals fluctuates stock price 
greatly, managers are often motivated to alter accounting numbers to meet analyst 
predictions.  Firms who remain ethical and refuse to engage in any sort of misrepresented 
financial statements should have more financial reporting credibility.  The more past 
financial reporting credibility a firm or manager has, the more likely investors will 
believe in the accounting estimates and earnings in the future.  This has a huge impact on 
firms’ valuation models of fair value assets during the financial crisis. 
 During the financial crisis, banks took enormous losses when they had to mark 
their financial assets to fair value.  When markets crashed and consumer confidence 
vanished, financial instruments ceased trading and lost much of their value.  Fair value 
accounting, as mandated by FAS 157, became an even greater nightmare for banks than 
ever before.  Because instruments with no market observable prices or inputs became 
difficult to value, firms had to use valuation models to come up with a price, and the 
valuations firms calculated would ultimately be lower than the instruments’ original 
values.  The loss would trickle down through the income statement and materialize in net 
income.   
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Much goes into an investor believing in a firm’s financial statements and other 
disclosures.  Past financial statement releases and the current state of the economy all 
contribute to investor perception.  If a firm has a history and reputation of conservative 
accounting, investors should trust their disclosures, even in times of crisis.  These firms 
should continue releasing numbers that accurately reflect the underlying economics of the 
firm, especially in the case of fair value asset disclosures and the amount of discretion 
with level three asset valuations.  The market should reflect this outlook.  On the other 
hand, lower credibility firms would attempt to manipulate their models to take a lesser hit 
in net income, confirming the market’s view.  Combining past financial reporting 
credibility in discretionary accruals with the enormous amount of estimation involved in 
the valuation models of financial instruments with no market observable inputs, it is 
reasonable that my hypothesis for this paper is as follows: 
H0: The market discounts the fair value assets of firms with less credible financial 
reporting. 
Ultimately, the market is going to maintain its perception of these firms as before the 
financial crisis.  Investors will not believe the accounting estimates of these lower 
credibility firms.  Higher credibility firms have two options: they can potentially 
capitalize on this by cashing in on their credibility and having faulty inputs to their 
models, or they can continue behaving the way they historically have.  Either way, the 
market will believe higher credibility firms’ valuation models, and discount the stock 
price of lower credibility firms.  However, it may have been that the market discounted 
the fair value assets of all firms during the financial crisis.  This is a possibility in the fact 
that all investor confidence could have been lost when markets collapsed.  The market 
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may have refused to believe any sort of valuation model and discounted the stock price 
accordingly because of the amount of uncertainty in all markets.  With the tough 
economic outlook and potentially disastrous losses attached to write-downs, investors 
could have believed that banks needed all the help that they could get and wanted a leg 
up against the competition by manipulating the estimation in their valuation models. 
 As mentioned previously, as the levels of assets increase from one to three, the 
amount of discretion increases.  My separate hypothesis is: 
H1: The market discounts less for level one assets than level two or level three 
assets. 
The market understands that firms have less room to manipulate level one financial assets 
because they are simply taking the listed prices for their valuations.  However, with level 
two and level three assets, firms have more wiggle room and judgment to value their 
assets higher than the assets’ true values.  The market expects that firms will do so, thus 
discounting the stock price according to what it thinks the true values are.   
Data Description 
I obtained all of my data off of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) using 
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat merged feature in the 
Bank Fundamentals Annual Research File.  WRDS is one of the leading research services 
used because it has access to much data across many disciplines in one place.  The 
Compustat database of WRDS receives its information from the financial statements of 
all the firms in the paper and puts it in the Bank Annual section.  The CRSP database 
comprises its market prices and volume data from stock exchanges. CRSP has its own 
unique permanent identifier (PERMNO) for each company, while Compustat’s unique 
 18 
 
permanent identifier (GVKEY) allows the two databases to be merged together for 
seamless time series examination. WRDS provides me with the most convenient and 
time-saving database with most of the data I need.  However, some variables are missing 
from the database, which forces me to leave them out of certain regressions.  All of the 
data from Compustat is expressed in millions, while the CRSP variable of shares 
outstanding is expressed in thousands.  To maintain consistent units, I divide shares 
outstanding by one thousand.  After gathering my variables, I create a variable 
(POST3MONTH) that took the months in the data and add it by 3 to have the stock price 
reflect the financial statement disclosures from 3 months earlier.  When I merge my data 
together, I use the PERMNO number and the POST3MONTH variable.  Furthermore, to 
control for any potential outliers and influential data points, I Winsorize all variables by 
1%.  Summary statistics are provided in the Appendix in Table 1. 
 All variables are collected from the CRSP/Compustat merged database.  To 
examine past financial reporting credibility, I must first look at various earnings 
management measures.  In the past, researchers have shown that two components of 
banks’ earnings are subject to manipulation: realized security gains and losses.  Banks are 
able to manipulate earnings by realizing more security gains or fewer security losses.  
Banks managers can also understate the loan loss provision to overstate earnings, similar 
to retail companies manipulating the bad debt expense related to accounts receivable. 
 Using Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002), the following regression model estimates 
the nondiscretionary portion of the realized security gains and losses: 
   	 
  
  
                                     (1) 
where: 
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RSGL = realized security gains and losses as a percentage of total assets at the 
 beginning of the year; 
LASSET = natural log of total assets; and 
UNGL = unrealized security gains and losses as a percentage of total assets at the  
               beginning of the year. 
I use another equation in Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) to estimate the nondiscretionary 
portion of the loan loss provision: 
   	 
   
 ∆ 
  
  
  
                       (2) 
where: 
LOSS = loan loss provision as a percentage of the average of beginning and  
 ending total loans; 
∆NPL = change in nonperforming loans as a percentage of the average of  
  beginning and ending total loans; 
LLR = loan loss reserve as a percentage of total loans at the beginning of the  
            year; 
LOANC = commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total loans; and 
LOANI = loans to individuals as a percentage of total loans. 
For equation (2), Beatty et al. also includes variables for real estate loans, depository 
institutional loans, finance agricultural production loans, and foreign government loans.9  
Unfortunately, the CRSP/Compustat Merged database did not include these variables, so 
I could not obtain and use them. 
                                                        
9 Beatty, Anne L., Bin Ke, and Kathy R. Petroni. "Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines 
across Publicly and Privately Held Banks." The Accounting Review 77.3 (2002): 547-70. Web. 18 Sept. 
2011 
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 I gather data from the beginning of 2000 to 2010 to estimate these earnings 
management models.  I then generate the residuals from the regression models to estimate 
abnormal accruals, with a different residual variable for each regression.  Using the 
residuals, I generate a five-year trailing mean to eliminate unnecessary earnings quality 
variations and to capture the firm’s true financial reporting credibility.  I then use the 
trailing mean to create the standard deviation of each residual variable as my measure of 
earnings quality.  To determine higher financial credibility firms and lower financial 
credibility firms, I create a dummy variable of POOREQ1 equal to 1 if the standard 
deviation of residuals for each firm from equation (1) is above the median and equal to 
zero if the standard deviation of residuals is below the median.  I also create a dummy 
variable of POOREQ2 equal to 1 if the standard deviation of residuals for each firm from 
equation (2) is above the median and equal to zero if the standard deviation of residuals is 
below the median.  The firms with a higher standard deviation of residuals means greater 
fluctuations in discretionary earnings, a sign for more earnings management and lower 
financial reporting credibility. 
 As soon as these variables are generated, all the variables for the final regression 
on price with all the fair value assets could be run.  To test H0 and H1, I estimate the 
following regression similar to Song, Thomas, and Yi (1995): 
   	 
 	 
  	1 
  	2 
 	3 
 	!1 " # 

 	!2 " # 
 	!3 " # 
 	$ 
 	%12 
 	&3 

  
 # 
                                                                                         (3) 
where: 
PRC: per share price for firm i 3 months following financial statement release 
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date at time t; 
 NFVA: non-fair value assets per share; 
 FVA1: level one fair value assets per share; 
 FVA2: level two fair value assets per share; 
 FVA3: level three fair value assets per share; 
 NFVL: non-fair value liabilities per share; 
 FVL12: combined level one and level two fair value liabilities per share; 
 FVL3: level three fair value liabilities per share; 
 NI: net income before extraordinary items per share; and 
POOREQ
 1: dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm is above the median  
and equal to zero when the firm is below the median for the residual model in 
equation (1). 
I also do the same for the second earnings quality measure:  
   	 
 	 
  	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  	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3 

  
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                                                                                          (4) 
 
where: 
POOREQ
 2: dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm is above the median and 
        equal to zero when the firm is below the median for the residual  
        model in equation (2). 
Equations (3) and (4) are essentially the same as the equation used in Song, et al. except 
for the fact that I replace their GOVRANK variable with the residual variable from 
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equations (1) and (2).10  Because banks’ balance sheets include a higher consistency of 
fair value assets than fair value liabilities and the fact that investors are more likely to 
examine assets over liabilities, I limit my design to interactions with fair value assets 
only.  I also want to see the effect of past financial reporting credibility on fair value asset 
disclosures on the balance sheets, so I include the earnings quality residual variable from 
two separate earnings quality measures.  To control for any bias in the absolute 
discretionary accruals approach, wherever I include interaction terms with my earnings 
quality measure, I also include interactions with sales volatility (interest and dividend 
income) and operating cash flow volatility.  Because a firm’s volatility of accruals is 
naturally dependent and therefore highly correlated upon these variables, controlling for 
these variables is a necessity to improve the test specification.11 
 I expect the valuation coefficients attached to level one and level two assets 
(liabilities) to be around one (negative one) because, in most cases, firms cannot value 
them incorrectly due to market observable prices or market observable inputs concerning 
their valuations.  However, because of the subjectivity regarding the valuation of level 
three assets (liabilities), the valuation coefficients attached to these variables should be 
less than one (negative one).  If my null hypothesis, that the market discounts the fair 
value assets of firms with less credible financial reporting, is correct, I would expect the 
coefficients attached to the interaction terms to be negative.  However, if all consumer 
and investor confidence vanished during the financial crisis, which is explained in my 
                                                        
10 Song, Chang Joon, Wayne B. Thomas, and Han Yi. "Value Relevance of FAS No. 157 Fair Value 
Hierarchy Information and the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms." The Accounting Review 
85.4 (2010): 1375. Web. 18 Sept. 2011. 
11 Hribar, P. and D. Craig Nichols (2007), The Use of Unsigned Earnings Quality Measures in Tests of 
Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting Research, 45: 1017–1053. 
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alternative hypothesis, I would expect the coefficients related to the interactions terms to 
be close to zero since past financial reporting credibility would not matter.  Investors may 
believe all firms would try to manipulate earnings to weather the storm of the financial 
crisis. 
Results 
 The results from Equation (3) can be found in Table 3.  Overall, the regression is 
a good predictor of stock price, with 58.43% of the variation in stock price being 
explained by the model.  As expected, level two assets positively impact stock price.  
Interestingly enough, level one and level three assets negatively affect stock price by 
about $0.01 and $0.24, respectively.  The coefficients, however, for both level one and 
level three assets are not significant, so we can take the negative relationship with a grain 
of salt. 
 In testing my hypothesis, the expectation was that all levels of assets interacting 
with my poor earnings quality dummy variable would be negative.  Only level two assets 
from firms with poor earnings quality negatively impact stock price.  The market further 
discounts level two assets for lower earnings quality firms by an additional $0.16, with 
this value being significant at the 1% level.  This is consistent with my hypothesis.  
Surprisingly enough, level one and level three assets from firms with poor earnings 
quality increase stock price by an extra $0.03 and $0.15, respectively.  However, like 
before, both coefficients attached to these assets are not significant, or even close to it.  
The 95% confidence interval is wide enough where no conclusions can be reached from 
the model.  Perhaps the most interesting part of the results is the coefficient attached to 
my poor earnings quality measure.  It is positive, meaning that firms with poor financial 
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reporting credibility receive a boost to stock price by about $0.40.  Even though this is 
not significant, it raises questions to the validity of the model.  The only explanation is 
that the market does might not look at earnings quality.  This, however, is highly 
unlikely.  
 The results for equation (4) can be found in Table 4.  Again, the model looks like 
a good indicator of stock price.  82.64% of the variation in stock price can be explained 
by the model.  The coefficients attached to level two and level three assets are positive, 
meaning stock price is positively impacted by these asset disclosures.  On the other hand, 
the model predicts that stock price is negatively impacted by level one asset disclosures.  
Keeping in mind that the only significant coefficient attached to these assets at the 10% 
level is the coefficient on level two assets, it might be coincidence that level one assets 
negatively affect stock price. 
 All coefficients attached to each level of assets when interacted with our earnings 
quality measure are not significant.  However, the closest one to significance is the 
coefficient attached to level one assets for lower quality firms, which is negative.  The 
model predicts that the market will further discount level one assets by $0.08 for firms 
with poor financial reporting credibility.  On the other hand, the model predicts that the 
market will add approximately $0.01 and $0.30 for level two and level three assets, 
respectively, for lower earnings quality companies.  It is hard to read into these numbers, 
though, since neither is close to significance.  The model also predicts that the market 
adds $3.58 to the stock price of firms that have lower quality earnings.  Unfortunately, 
this regression model has a low amount of observations (75), thus making it hard to 
gather concrete evidence. 
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 I then decided to alter my poor earnings quality measure slightly.  Instead of using 
the median to determine the cutoff point between good and poor earnings quality firms, I 
wanted to look at the extremes because of the possible uncertainty regarding the 
classification of financial reporting credibility of firms in the middle fifty percent.  I 
decided to designate the top quartile of the standard deviation of residuals for both 
equations (1) and (2) as poor earnings quality firms and the bottom quartile firms as good 
earnings quality firms.  The results turned out better. 
 The results for the equivalent of equation (3) with the different earnings quality 
variables were better, shown in Table 3.  Again, the model is fair, with 66.41% of the 
variation in stock price being explained by the regression model.  Both the fair value 
asset disclosures for level two and level three assets turned out positive, with level two 
being significant.  Fair value asset disclosures for level two assets increase stock price by 
$0.25, and level three assets increase stock price by $0.05.  According to the model, level 
one asset disclosures decrease stock price by $0.12, but this number is not significant. 
 In looking at the effect of poor financial reporting credibility, the model is 
consistent with my hypothesis.  Each coefficient attached to the interaction terms for each 
level of assets is negative, with the value becoming more negative as the levels increase.  
Firms in the worst quartile generally have their level one assets discounted another $0.03, 
their level two assets another $0.16, and their level three assets another $0.50.  The 
coefficient attached to level two assets is significant at the 5% level, and, though the 
coefficient attached to level three assets is not significant, its confidence interval contains 
mostly negative numbers.  Level one assets interacting with the poor earnings quality 
variable is not significant.  Firms with poor financial reporting credibility have their stock 
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discounted another $0.70, even though the coefficient attached to the poor earnings 
quality variable is not significant. 
 The equivalent of equation (4), with the results in Table 4, is another good model, 
with 93.44% of the variation in stock price being explained by the model.  However, the 
number of observations (36) is low so it is necessary to take the results with a grain of 
salt.  The coefficients attached to each asset level are positive, meaning each positively 
affects stock price.  Level one asset disclosures increase stock price by $1.41, level two 
by $0.18, and level three by $1.59.  It is interesting that level three assets have the highest 
influence on stock price, since it is the least reliable.  It is also the most significant 
coefficient out of the three, with level one being the least reliable. 
 Poor earnings quality firms have their level one assets further discounted by 
$2.84, with this coefficient being significant.  Both coefficients for level two and level 
three assets for firms with poor credibility are positive, with level two asset disclosures 
adding $0.29 to stock price and level three adding $0.92.  However, both are not 
significant, with level three being the least significant.  Firms with poor credibility have 
their stocks further discounted by $6.01, but this number is also not significant. 
 Unfortunately, while each of the models seem like good predictors with high R2 
values and high F-values, most of the variables I wanted to examine turned out to be 
insignificant.  Maybe investors lost all confidence during the crisis and no differences 
exist between poor earnings quality firms and good earnings quality firms.  The market 
simply viewed all firms the same.  If not, there may have been problems with the data, 
resulting in insignificant variables. 
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Conclusion 
 It is hard to reach definitive conclusions from my results.  Most of the variables I 
wanted to examine were insignificant.  However, the ones that were significant supported 
my hypothesis that the market discounts the fair value assets for firms with less credible 
financial reporting.  Perhaps the biggest conclusion drawn from this study is that financial 
reporting credibility matters more for the poorest earnings quality firms.  The results from 
the models improved when we examined the extreme quartiles of earnings quality. 
 The biggest limitation of this study is the database I used to obtain all of my data.  
In the case of equation (2), I could not imitate Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) fully 
because of various variable omissions from the database.  Other variable omissions 
contributed to a low number of observations in both versions of equation (4), as much of 
the data did not go as far back in years as needed. 
 As years go by and more data becomes available for fair value assets, researchers 
can attempt this study again or another study examining the same issue presented here.  
The desired results may become more conclusive and firms, researchers, and the market 
may have a greater depth of knowledge into financial reporting credibility.  
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Appendix 
Figure I 
Summary Statistics 
variable mean Standard 
deviation 
min p25 p50 p75 max 
RSGL -1.37e-07 7.72e-07 -9.08e-06 -3.06e-08 3.26e-13 2.40e-08 1.53e-06 
UNGL 4.62e-08 6.58e-07 -5.18e-06 -3.38e-08 1.49e-08 1.20e-07 5.46e-06 
Lasset 7.66734 1.599523 4.909783 6.593087 7.375798 8.318289 14.93574 
LOSS .0169461 .0172357 -.0024734 .0042628 .0103022 .0247782 .0675672 
∆NPL .0036871 .0109227 -.003897 .0000887 .0006322 .0024724 .0793109 
LLR .0186815 .0087813 .0034288 .013008 .0162039 .0225606 .0509344 
LOANC .3070997 .1328619 .0813148 .2355147 .2858891 .3622151 .7332646 
LOANI .1745977 .1113082 0 .095939 .1514851 .2719088 .4552373 
PRC 14.02696 12.82869 1.21 5.025 10.44 18.33 83.48 
NFVA 149.2199 118.9388 7.09244 91.66332 127.8948 175.9441 1774.226 
FVA1 2.550928 18.68369 0 0 .0396389 .4973074 357.1873 
FVA2 26.78032 24.40832 0 10.41959 20.1325 34.69809 180.1587 
FVA3 1.014221 2.95341 0 0 .0185229 .5949324 27.34974 
NFVL 12346.22 48835.81 179.207 718.052 1468.859 4134.48 415728 
FVL12 .8037386 4.103527 0 0 0 .0869875 68.7064 
FVL3 .0908368 .5747432 0 0 0 0 9.770352 
NI -.191618 4.105819 -67.5242 -.641684 .50977 1.380214 20.17519 
12
 
 
                                                        
12 RSGL: Realized security gains and losses as a percentage of total assets at the beginning of the year 
   UNGL: Unrealized security gains and losses as a percentage of total assets at the beginning of the year 
   LASSET: Natural log of total assets 
   LOSS: Loan loss provision as a percentage of the average of beginning and ending total loans 
   ∆NPL: Change in nonperforming loans as a percentage of the average of beginning and ending total loans 
   LLR: Loan loss reserve as a percentage of total loans at the beginning of the year 
   LOANC: Commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total loans 
   LOANI: Loans to individuals as a percentage of total loans 
   PRC: Per share price for firm i 3 months following financial statement release date at time t 
   NFVA: Non-fair value assets per share 
   FVA1: Level one fair value assets per share 
   FVA2: Level two fair value assets per share 
   FVA3: Level three fair value assets per share 
   NFVL: Non-fair value liabilities per share 
   FVL12: Combined level one and level two fair value liabilities per share 
   FVL3: Level three fair value liabilities per share 
   NI: Net income before extraordinary items per share 
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Figure II 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Observations=700 
 PRC NFVA FVA1 FVA2 FVA3 NFVL FVL12 FVL3 NI 
PRC 1.0000         
NFVA 0.4528 1.0000        
FVA1 0.3577 0.6689 1.0000       
FVA2 0.4422 0.2953 -0.0034 1.0000      
FVA3 0.2161 0.2282 0.0800 0.1823 1.0000     
NFVL 0.2557 0.0686 0.0708 0.0998 0.2777 1.0000    
FVL12 0.2427 0.1279 0.0975 0.2036 0.2820 0.6073 1.0000   
FVL3 0.0325 0.0796 0.0171 0.0878 0.2383 0.2356 0.3985 1.0000  
NI 0.4052 -0.1224 0.1650 0.0916 0.0450 0.0888 0.0840 0.0168 1.0000 
13
 
                                                        
13 PRC: Per share price for firm i 3 months following financial statement release date at time t 
   NFVA: Non-fair value assets per share 
   FVA1: Level one fair value assets per share 
   FVA2: Level two fair value assets per share 
   FVA3: Level three fair value assets per share 
   NFVL: Non-fair value liabilities per share 
   FVL12: Combined level one and level two fair value liabilities per share 
   FVL3: Level three fair value liabilities per share 
   NI: Net income before extraordinary items per share 
 33 
 
 
Figure III 
Results for Equation (3) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES PRC PRC 
   
NFVA 0.0402*** 0.0435*** 
 (0.00692) (0.00918) 
NI 1.122*** 1.022*** 
 (0.201) (0.239) 
FVA1 -0.0144 -0.123 
 (0.0572) (0.107) 
FVA2 0.233*** 0.249*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0713) 
FVA3 -0.237 0.0473 
 (0.487) (0.418) 
NFVL 3.25e-05*** 5.42e-05*** 
 (9.30e-06) (1.42e-05) 
FVL12 -0.176 -1.127*** 
 (0.202) (0.266) 
FVL3 -1.536** 0.654 
 (0.719) (0.709) 
FVA1*POOREQ1 0.0256 -0.0336 
 (0.0855) (0.0879) 
FVA2*POOREQ1 -0.162*** -0.163** 
 (0.0479) (0.0670) 
FVA3*POOREQ1 0.154 -0.503 
 (0.421) (0.388) 
POOREQ1 0.396 -0.701 
 (1.180) (1.743) 
Constant 2.090 2.115 
 (1.390) (1.849) 
   
Observations 699 320 
R-squared 0.584 0.664 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
14
                                                        
14 Variable descriptions can be found in footnote 9 on page 30. 
POOREQ1: Dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm is above the median and equal to zero when the firm 
is below the median for the residual model found in equation (1) 
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Figure IV 
Results for Equation (4) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES PRC PRC 
   
NFVA 0.0192 -0.0246 
 (0.0298) (0.0336) 
NI 6.881*** 3.019 
 (1.879) (3.667) 
FVA1 -0.206 1.418 
 (0.282) (1.941) 
FVA2 0.248* 0.184 
 (0.132) (0.183) 
FVA3 0.235 1.586 
 (0.814) (1.193) 
NFVL -1.65e-05 4.93e-05** 
 (2.03e-05) (1.91e-05) 
FVL12 0.365 -2.428** 
 (0.501) (1.013) 
FVL3 -3.003*** 25.58*** 
 (1.025) (8.551) 
FVA1*POOREQ2 -0.0800 -2.840** 
 (0.0615) (1.364) 
FVA2*POOREQ2 0.0114 0.289 
 (0.167) (0.201) 
FVA3*POOREQ2 0.297 0.924 
 (0.410) (2.390) 
POOREQ2 3.575 -6.008 
 (6.325) (5.340) 
Constant 1.790 5.905 
 (5.601) (4.485) 
   
Observations 75 36 
R-squared 0.826 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
15
 
 
                                                        
15 Variable descriptions can be found in footnote 9 on page 30. 
POOREQ2: Dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm is above the median and equal to zero when the firm 
is below the median for the residual model found in equation (2) 
